We must tackle the vetting system's flaws

Ian Huntley's conviction for the murder of Jessica Chapman and Holly Wells sent shock waves through every institution responsible for vulnerable individuals – and demonstrated that the vetting process may be a sham. The home secretary's inquiry in the wake of the Soham verdicts must now address these crucial issues.

Soham Village College headteacher Howard Gilbert and his management team had been cautious when appointing their caretaker. There had been problems with the previous incumbent. They wanted to be sure the new man was right for the job. They relied on police checks that should have revealed both convictions and other, so-called "soft", police intelligence, but which failed to do so.

Individual error led someone in Cambridgeshire police to check the applicant under his new name of Nixon, though he had admitted on the form that his previous surname was Huntley and on two occasions, Humberside officers had opportunities to place on the record that "Huntley" and "Nixon" were the same man.

These lapses had catastrophic consequences. The brutal truth seems to be that too many police officers have regarded these checks as a distraction from "real" police work. They have not been made to understand that these seemingly mundane tasks are vital to child protection.

Humberside police also routinely threw away intelligence on Huntley, apparently because they over-interpreted the Data Protection Act. Quite how they were supposed to operate any kind of effective detection with a system that weeded out information on suspects after a month had elapsed has not been explained.

It also remains unclear whether Humberside is an exception, or whether such failings are endemic. Some experts have said they were astounded by the force's actions: none have said it is uniquely bad.

Too many police officers have regarded checks as a distraction from ‘real’ police work rather than tasks vital to child protection

What needs to be done? To begin with, the entire vetting process, now administered by the Criminal Records Bureau, needs to be reviewed. This is not only a question of looking at individual slip-ups.

There are other known weaknesses in the system that Huntley's application did not flag up. For example, the police national computer did all that was asked of it in this case. However, there is plenty of evidence that some courts and police forces are slow to input data, that the technology itself is unfit for purpose and that there are questions about accuracy.

Likewise, the system cannot currently prevent a suspected paedophile from simply creating a new identity. Huntley changed his name by deed poll, entitling him to a driving licence and passport under his new name. He chose to reveal his original surname, but had he not done so, even a vigilant police force would have given him the all-clear.

The system remains too slow. There are unacceptable delays that either lead to unsuitable individuals being appointed, or vital staff being told they have to wait until the process is completed.

There are wider questions, too. The inquiry will need to tackle the apparent tension between civil liberties and child protection. As a first step, it could more explicitly state the information that police can legitimately retain, and what it should discard. There also needs to be guidance on what should be revealed to employers. Too much depends on criminal proof: if it is not "beyond reasonable doubt", the presumption is that information should not be disclosed. When it is disclosed, employers are told they cannot reveal it to the individual concerned. This benefits nobody.