In the wake of last month’s spate of letter bomb attacks, much information has been disseminated concerning which type of kit represents the best solution for companies to use in detecting such devices. Are security managers right to believe what they have been reading? Simon Demetriou puts the record straight.
The beginning of February marked a string of letter bombs in Britain. The first (on Monday 5 February) exploded at the London headquarters of Capita, the company administering London’s traffic congestion charge. One female employee was injured...
On the following day, a suspected letter bomb ‘detonated’ at a Business Centre in Berkshire. Two people were injured. Media reports suggested that Vantis – the target of this particular attack – is also involved in the administration of traffic charges, including the collection of fines for speeding violations...
On Wednesday 7 February, a member of staff was injured by a parcel bomb which exploded at the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA) Centre in Swansea...
The threat from letter bombs has afflicted the UK since 1972, when Ami Sachori became the first person in Britain to be killed by such a device when one was sent to the Israeli Embassy by the Palestinian organisation Black September. In the years since then, the UK has seen sporadic and sustained letter bomb campaigns from Animal Rights activists, the IRA and an assortment of lone individuals.
Often, the person(s) whose responsibility it is to undertake a risk assessment thinks only historically when assessing the postal terrorist risks to their company. The following considerations are proven reasons why a company is at risk, but they are (alas) also proven reasons that are rarely considered...
Is your industry at risk? Anti-capitalist groups claim that any company whose aim it is to make a profit is ‘controversial’. Animal Rights activists commonly target those companies who do business with companies who do business with other companies who then do business with an organisation that tests products and substances on animals.
The recent letter bomb campaigns show that any company responsible for fining, debt collection and law enforcement can also be at huge risk. Potentially, all businesses could say that they are either in a controversial industry or that they supply products or services to a controversial sector.
Is your location in a high risk area? Just by being in a major city you are at greater risk from postal terror attack. For example, a business in the City is at risk due to its proximity to tourist attractions such as the Tower of London, the chance of misdirected mail from a nearby business and the fact that you are in a major centre for world commerce.
It’s the terrorists’ aim to hit commerce. The attacks on New York’s World Trade Centre in 2001 and on the London Underground in 2005 show that it is the West’s commercial capability terrorist cells want to wreck.
Do you have any links to business practices that are controversial? Thinking about the threat laterally rather than literally or historically enables you to be ready for the unexpected. For example, a high profile businessman who supports animal testing places his small family-based solicitor firm at risk by association. Similarly, taxi firms, courier firms, office suppliers and financial services companies have found that by knowing their customers they are able to guard against the threat from postal terror attacks.
Is there any way that you could have a disgruntled customer or employee? It is now commonplace that businesses need to make redundancies in order to survive. Some of those who lose their jobs do not take lightly to this enforced change of circumstances.
In surveys, companies – however high or low risk they may be – claim that their biggest threat emanates from their very own customers and employees. This reaffirms that all businesses are facing a risk.
Post Room security audit
Knowing your risks is all well and good (‘Delivering danger’, Briefing Papers, SMT, November 2006, p41), but acting on them is of the utmost importance. Undertaking a Post Room security audit can be a good way to ensure that you are not forgetting anything important. Begin with these basic pointers:
- are the windows of your Post Room coveredin safety film (given that the majority of injuries caused by letter bombs stem from glass fragmentation, etc)?
- is there a dedicated incident manager on site at all times?
- is there an X-ray machine available, and is it used and maintained on a regular basis?
- is there a blast container in place?
- what facilities and procedures are in place if an envelope containing powder (or what looks like a letter bomb) is received?
- where are non-delivered items stored?
- does your Post Room manager know in advance of every non-standard item that is expected to arrive (including your staffs’ Internet shopping) so as to alleviate unnecessary suspicion?
- is the air conditioning a separate system or does it connect the entire building?
- what incidents have occurred in the past twelve months (including verbally threatening letters and hoaxes)?
Many so-called security ‘experts’ have recently claimed that a desktop or hand-held metal detector provides the key to intercepting postal terrorist devices. This is simply not the case.
Metal detection represents only 5% of the solution. Recent devices and other incendiary mechanisms can explode using friction, just like the striking of a match causes it to ignite.
In many cases, an explosive device will not even contain metal. The suppliers of desktop metal detectors claim that they alarm only on circuitry and not paper clips or staples. Incendiary devices could use flat tin foil batteries which the unit would not recognise.
As Dr John Wyatt MBE – a renowned specialist in bomb disposal at the SDS Group and regular contributor to SMT – duly points out: “Metal detectors create a huge number of false positives. The more there are, the more disillusioned the staff will become and, eventually, they’ll come to disregard the equipment... and you cannot put a postal tube or a parcel into a desktop metal detector.” In addition, metal detectors can only tell you that a metal is present – it will not tell you what the device is, or whether there’s cause for alarm.
There are also dangers inherent in any reliance upon explosive sniffers. Explosive sniffer manufacturers are always keen to point out that their products are not designed for Post Room use – they are intended for use by the Ministry of Defence and the police service in detecting a pre-programmed number of explosives. Relying on this technology to detect letter bombs misses several key facets of the latter, namely that:
Many so-called security ‘experts’ have recently claimed that a desktop or hand-held metal detector provides the key to intercepting postal terrorist devices. This is simply not the case. Metal detection represents only 5% of the solution. Recent devices and other incendiary mechanisms can explode due to friction, just like the striking of a match causes it to ignite
- items commonly found in supermarkets and Garden Centres are often used due to their explosive qualities... an explosive sniffer is not programmed to detect such everyday items;
- letter bombs are ready-made devices, and thus it takes analysis and human judgement to correctly identify such a device... for example, training will show you that an explosive device should have four components: a detonator, a form of explosive, a power source (such as a battery) and a trigger... the item is designed to explode when it is opened, so it’s all-important to be 100% happy that something is completely safe before it is opened.
Now that the terrorist threat facing Britain from home-grown al-Qaeda agents is higher than at any time since September 11, security managers must not overlook the need for physical security, search and access control.
What kind of devices are suicide bombers likely to employ? A low-yield nuclear-fission bomb is unlikely due to its weight (45 kg – about the weight of a teenage girl)! Terrorists are far more likely to try to deploy a radiological dispersal device (or ‘dirty bomb’) as this would be a comparatively cheaper and more deployable option.
A possible method of weapons delivery could be a suitcase concealing contraband radioisotopes hidden in an aeroplane’s luggage compartment.
Handheld Radioisotope Identification Devices (RIDs) have been deployed at all major airports in the USA and the UK, and could be seen in corporate sites. However, according to a June 2005 General Accounting Office report, much of the radiation detection equipment has limitations. In the UK, the solution has been to install both fixed and mobile detection units, pedestrian portal, personal radiation detectors and handheld RIDs based on passive systems. Her Majesty’s Revenue & Customs officers are responsible for operating the equipment at points of entry and for the initial detection of any imported radiological material.
Of course, public vigilance is absolutely vital in the war on terror – we should all be prepared to report anything that is out of the ordinary.
The new threat scenario requires the detection of explosives and the means to detonate them. Now, a swab can be taken from a person’s clothes, skin or baggage and entered into an automatic screening device for a near-instantaneous result. However, the sampling process is slow and not ideal for mass-detection.
Trace-detection portals help here by blowing several puffs of air onto a person to shake loose particles that have settled on the body and then analyse them for explosive residue. It’s believed that an all-in-one trace detection and metal detector gateway is being developed to do the two jobs in one.
‘Z backscatter’ technology can, it’s claimed, detect weapons (including composite weapons), drugs and explosives even if the substances are in sealed containers and no external residue is present. In a similar vein, millimetre-wave screening technology has the potential to detect concealed weapons or explosives on a person. When a threat object is hidden under a person’s clothing, the intensity of the millimetre-wave signal increases as the location is scanned. This eventually appears as a ‘hot spot’ superimposed on the visual image from the digital camera or infrared camera to identify threat objects carried by people moving around in the dark.
Threat of powder-based attacks
What recent events have proven to security managers and directors is that terrorists will consider attacking public and commercial areas at will. That being the case, it’s essential the technology at your building entrances is as robust as possible.
Since 2001’s anthrax attacks in the US, we have seen at least one reportable incident per week of a powder being received in an envelope by a UK business. Add to this at least one incident every week that’s not reported (a company does not often want to publicise such adverse attention, or may feel a hoax is not important) and the number of powder-based incidents could top 100 every year.
What are the modern day implications of an employer’s Duty of Care? Some of the recipients of these latest letter bombs have witnessed not only the absence of equipment, but also the use of old equipment can mean that letter bombs and other postal terrorist devices are missed.
It’s therefore an employer’s Duty of Care to ensure that not only is the right equipment installed to combat the threats, but also that this equipment is technologically capable of coping with modern threats.
Some companies outsource mail screening. However, be sure to check who has categorical responsibility if an explosive device should arrive at your site. You could find that not only have you parted with excessive expense, but that you still have the liability should there be an injury to a member of your staff.
X-ray: 95% of the solution
The vital moments when intercepting a letter bomb or powder through the post is before the item is opened. The best way to provide conclusive proof of whether an item is safe or suspect is to use X-ray equipment.
When specifying what type of equipment you wish to procure, be sure to ask of the manufacturers involved in the contract tender the following questions:
- is there a form of powder detection?
- was the software designed within the last three years to cope with modern threats (and make sure that you are given written proof to that effect)?
- is there a form of ongoing training built into the program?
- does the machine have save/archive/print/e-mail/remote operation capabilities?
Source
SMT
Postscript
Simon Demetriou is marketing manager at Todd Research (www.toddresearch.co.uk)
