Ready for collection?

'Insight' also disclosed that the widow was a member of the Special Forces Club! Quite why this information was proffered the Lord alone only knows. One suspects it was probably just for journalistic dramatisation.

In any event, the information gathered appears to have been converted into intelligence and used by BAe Systems to monitor CAAT activities and details. BAe Systems also seems to have acquired letters leaked between CAAT and influential politicians and members of the Establishment.

The following week (Sunday 5 October), 'Insight' ran a feature on page 14 entitled "Security company spied on road protesters" in which it was alleged that Group 4 Total Security used information gathered by the aforementioned widow on the aggressive protests staged against the Newbury by-pass.

For the purposes of this discourse, no further comment will be made on 'Insight's ability to collect information and use it to undermine two highly respectable companies carrying out legitimate business – except to say 'Insight' infers that, while Governments may indulge in counter-intelligence to protect a nation, the police may deploy 'intelligence-led' (at last!) operations in the fight against crime and the media search for 'leaks' in the pursuit of profit, corporations apparently have no right to find out anything about the opposition.

'Insiders': the greatest threat
While some of Security Management Today's readers may find the manufacture of arms and the building of roads totally abhorrent activities, both are legitimate business strands with which to be involved. How, though, might organisations in those sectors look to protect themselves from acts of protest?

First, it must be accepted that in every organisation there are likely to be active and passive factions supporting local, ethical and environmental pressure groups. Democratic countries accept the right to object within the limitations of the law. In espionage terms, 'The Insider' is the greatest threat, and best placed to collect a mass of selected, single-sourced information. Something that technology can never do. In the majority of public bodies and companies vetting doesn't exist, with members of staff employed on trust (and even, perhaps, following a reference).

Second, the gathering of information against opponents isn't illegal. After the ground-breaking National Car Parks prosecution back in March 1993 – in which two defendants were found not guilty of industrial espionage against Euro Car Parks – Judge Richard Hawkins QC said: "It's not a crime to indulge in industrial espionage. Trespass is not a crime, and neither is infiltration."

This judgement on industrial espionage is of fundamental importance, for it allows organisations to use espionage techniques in order to protect their assets and resources, not only on behalf of shareholders but as guardians of employment. It also means that competing companies and pressure groups must accept the fact they're legitimate targets in an environment in which we're frequently told: "In business there are no rules."

Third, everyone enjoys the basic right to protest. It's how disagreement is applied that's the key here. Pressure groups themselves are not a new phenomenon. Today, there are probably several thousand of them in existence, ranging from the internationally-powerful Greenpeace through to local organisations – the NIMBYs – protesting against something that's affecting their own lives.

There are those, of course, who are prepared to take direct action. Class War, for example, claimed to be a "federation of groups and individuals who have come together to do something about the society in which we live...", suggesting that "real change can only come about by working class people organising themselves to deal with problems that they experience, and using direct action against the institution and individuals that cause them". For this organisation, "violence is a necessary part of the class war, but as mass class violence out in the open, not elitist terrorist action."

To be successful, every pressure group requires information. What happens at the company's facility/facilities? Who in the company can help them gain access (to premises)? What are the telephone and fax numbers such that an electronic protest can be made and communication streams disrupted? Can a reconnaissance visit be undertaken without any chance of discovery?

Further questions would also spring readily to the minds of protesters. Where is the reception located? Who staffs it, and what support structures do they have? What is the best part(s) of the building(s) to occupy from a publicity point of view? Where's the chief executive's office? Where's the main central office containing all the juicy company information? Where can the most disruption be caused? What's the maximum length of occupation time possible?

For its part, CAAT is regarded as a peaceful and non-militant pressure group continuously highlighting its objection to the British contribution to the international arms trade. Founded in 1974, it had – and still maintains – close connections to the global peace movement, openly broadcasting its activities on the Internet at www.caat.org The organisation actively encourages members to buy a single share in defence companies, which then permits awkward questions to be asked at Annual General Meetings.

CAAT has also targeted defence companies with leafleting campaigns, and organised peaceful protests at arms exhibitions. When the now-defunct Thorn EMI Electronics took over MEL in Crawley in 1991, a devotee of CAAT skirmished with a Member of Parliament on local radio concerning the immorality of the arms trade.

In espionage terms, ‘The Insider’ is the greatest threat and best placed to collect a mass of selected, single-sourced information. Something that technology can never do. In the majority of public bodies and companies vetting doesn’t exist, with members

Fluidity among pressure groups
'Swords into Ploughshares' is also opposed to the international arms trade, but is more aggressive than CAAT. Several years ago, an alleged member of 'Swords' infiltrated the BAe Systems facility at Stevenage to draw employees' attention to the defence work they were doing, then causes £90,000 worth of damage by spreading animal blood on PCs.

CAAT is bound to have been infiltrated by militants prepared to use the pressure group as a front. This follows the development of terrorism as an ideology which isn't able to achieve its aims through democratic means, and thereby resorts to violence in order to do so. In these days of increased use of direct action by aggressive pressure groups (such as the anti-capitalist movements), if those groups wish to raise the stakes then companies such as BAe Systems and Group 4 are fully entitled to take steps to protect their business dealings.

As Judge Stephen Rodwell QC commented following the Woolworth/Dixons affair back in 1989, in which telephone conversations were intercepted: "Companies have a legitimate right to protect their commercial interests" – as long as information collection stays within the law.

The provision of disinformation
How can companies defend themselves? Counter-intelligence is not a self-help business, any more than financial auditing or quality assurance. Bungled operations are an embarrassment. Generally speaking, the police cannot be relied upon because most police officers don't understand business. Similarly, the majority of corporate executives lack the culture, experience, resources, willingness and finance to create effective counter-intelligence regimes, instead fighting the short term threat.

In truth, counter-intelligence operations should be organised by experienced security practitioners who know how to calculate the severity and extent of the threat, and who can then recommend methods for meeting an attack head on (which may well include the provision of disinformation, the offering of useless information and source handling).

Fortunately, there's now a handful of security practitioners out there familiar with HUMINT and the running of counter-intelligence operations.

Security consultants are an effective tool. However, they can often be used as a 'cut off' – that's corporate speak for a deniable and disposable resource – in the event of disclosure and are therefore at risk from discredit.

In conclusion, then, companies are entitled to collect information both overtly and covertly on any individual or pressure group posing a threat to the business, its people or property. The intelligence gained should be used defensively to disrupt activity prejudicial to the safety of employees, the security of profit and your firm's ability to conduct business.