Far from multiplex being at fault for the wembley fiasco, Geoff Bewsey argues the GMP contract left no flexibility for problem-solving

Is Multiplex entirely to blame for what has happened at Wembley? I would argue not.

The guaranteed maximum price (GMP) contract is the real villain, because by adopting it, Wembley National Stadium Ltd pretty much tied its own hands. It wanted to stand back and not get involved in case its input came back to bite later in the form of a variation.

Politicians perceive GMP contracts as a panacea for all cost overruns. A GMP ought to be good for a client who wants to make sure they will spend no more money than they have budgeted for. But it doesn't give them the flexibility to go in and help get the job done on time. Clients can become intimidated by the terms of their own contract.

A hypothetical exchange at Wembley might have involved Multiplex asking for clarification on what the client wanted in, say, the hospitality suite finishes, and receiving the reply: "It's all in the GMP, you know what to do." Under GMP the client and contractor often end up circling each other around the contract, and the management of basic information becomes very difficult.

A different contract will recognise the need for mechanisms to enable the owner to take action to move the project forward when difficulties arise. In the hospitality suite example above, for example, Wembley Stadium could have worked with Multiplex to find a solution to move the project forward, rather than opting for trench warfare, guarding only the GMP.

If the contracting relationship allows constructive involvement, changes can be made which can save the contractor time and money and help them deliver the project on time and within budget.

It's the same with time issues. The classic contracting relationship leaves the real risk of delay with the owner, but gives them no tools to manage those risks. Will any amount of liquidated damages really compensate for all the consequences of the new stadium being a year late?

Progress monitoring

With wembley having adopted the role of absentee landlord multiplex can only look to the supply chain for solutions

A solution could be for the contract to make provision for payment to the contractor for proper time management and reporting. If this is not done the client then has a budget for stepping in to do their own progress monitoring to find out how the project is progressing. So even if the contractor fails to monitor progress properly, the client can get reliable progress information enabling them to make informed decisions on likely completion dates, financing adjustments and productive acceleration options.

As it is, the allergic reaction to involvement as a result of the GMP contract and its isolation from the management of time risks mean that Wembley can do little more than commentate on the downfall of its own development.

Related to that are the issues Multiplex inherited from the design, which was novated to it to make the contract design and build. By doing that Wembley was washing its hands of the design risk, but also cutting itself off from being part of the solution.

Co-operative relationships

On its supply chain relationships, does Multiplex deserve a reputation for being a hard-nosed, street fighting contractor? I don't think so. My reading of the situation is that Multiplex has very co-operative relationships with subcontractors in Australia, which it forged of necessity in a more heavily unionised labour market. It hoped to replicate that here and was caught off guard by adversarial mindsets embedded in the UK supply chain. Multiplex was a bit naive, maybe, but it learned fast.

It's impossible to envisage how the many technical problems that have blighted the project have not been fuelled by the extreme financial pressures the contract places on Multiplex. With Wembley having adopted the role of absentee landlord, Multiplex can only look down the supply chain to find solutions to its problems. This inevitably led to it applying pressure on subcontractors, seeking performance related to time and cost which is likely to be at odds with a high-quality product.

It is conceivable that if the contract relationship between Multiplex and Wembley had served both parties well, then Multiplex's reputation as a highly competent contractor, which was surely one of the reasons it was selected for this landmark project, would have been seen here and would have led to a better product in a shorter time. cm

Theatre of pain: wembley’s woes

Feb 2000 The consortium of Bovis Lend Lease and Multiplex win the Wembley contract, beating HBG and Mowlem. Sir Robert McAlpine and Bouyges pull out, citing onerous contract terms. The client, Wembley National Stadium Ltd (WNSL), refuses to make it a two-stage tender, insisting on a lump sum, fixed price contract. An unnamed contractor slates WNSL in Building magazine, describing it as a “client from hell”.

Mar 2000 WNSL chief executive Bob Stubbs assures the press that contract negotiations are going fine: “It’s not easy agreeing a contract of this size, but [they] are getting to grips with the details of the scheme.”

Jul 2000 Talks hit a rocky patch as Bovis-Multiplex come in with a price £50m higher than WNSL’s target. Stubbs tells Building: “We’re not meeting anyone halfway. We either get the right numbers [for the price] or we retender the whole thing.” By the end of the month, despite a value engineering exercise, the consortium’s price is still around £20m more than WNSL’s target of £316m-£320m.

Sep 2000 WNSL terminates the Bovis-Multiplex contract. Its insistence on a GMP puts off erstwhile suitors such as Mowlem, HBG and Sir Robert McAlpine. Bouyges expresses a renewed interest but just a week after the Bovis-Multiplex team are let go, WNSL announces it has chosen a new partner: Multiplex – on its own.
Bovis threatens to sue.

Two years are wasted as politicians wrangle over what Wembley should be for, and WNSL has trouble attracting investors. Costs creep up and the design goes back to the drawing board several times.

Oct 2002 Lift off. Demolition on the old Wembley starts. Multiplex has 40 months and a budget of £445m. Paul Gandy, Multiplex UK managing director, tells Building: “The scheme is very advanced and defined. I think it’s one of those schemes that isn’t going to be subject to a great deal of change.”
Sadly, his successors will end up singing a very different tune.

2003 A good year. Headlines at a minimum, anyway. But can the WNSL/Multiplex relationship work?

2004 Subcontractor issues emerge. The lifting of the iconic arch is delayed with problems in the welding joints blamed. In a surprise move Multiplex ejects steelwork subcontractor Cleveland Bridge and installs Hollandia. Is this an early sign of the contractor fighting for elbow room in the GMP?

2005 Money problems dominate headlines as the project heads for the rocks. Multiplex admits any profit would come from winning a court battle against Cleveland Bridge. In May it announces it will lose £45m. Things are not going well with Hollandia, either. Losses will hit £73m if talks to cap steel costs fail.

2006 Subcontractor AR Security walks out over pay, and Multiplex’s estimated losses rise to £106m. Multiplex holds crisis talks with Hollandia to avert mass redundancies relating to cash flow. Finally, last month, as Multiplex deals with a cluster of quality issues (falling roof beam, faulty sewerage and subsidence) the viability of the GMP contract for the job lies in tatters as Multiplex announces its intention to claim £150m from WNSL for 560 design changes.