Let's Park those thoughts…

Car parks come in various shapes and sizes, cropping up in all kinds of locations. In turn, they present a variety of security risks to their owners and operators, not to mention those who use them. Car parks sited within or near airports or prestigious public buildings, for instance, can offer terrorists with a relatively easy means by which to surreptitiously place explosives or chemicals within close proximity to their target. That may cause substantial damage and/or considerable loss of life.

The use of car parks by terrorists was demonstrated with dramatic effect at the House of Commons in 1979, when the Provisional IRA placed a bomb under Airey Neave's ministerial vehicle and killed him. And who can forget that horrific event in 1993 when terrorists made use of a lorry bomb in a car park underneath New York's World Trade Centre, killing six and injuring over 1,000 people? In terms of the latter, it's a great pity the warning signals were not heeded.

Threat and risk assessment

When security professionals are considering a new or existing car park, the first (and most important) step to be carried out is the joint threat and risk assessment for the locality. This encompasses evaluating what assets are involved (not just vehicles but also any adjoining premises, as well as members of staff and/or customers), the priorities for protection [-] buildings, people, assets, etc [-] and who might want to damage them. This assessment will determine what steps are needed in order to protect lives and resources, mitigate the effects of a terrorist act and discourage any thoughts of petty crime.

The major consideration during the risk assessment will be the level of human interaction. Who is going to be using the car park? Where will people be when they are using it? Where do the greatest dangers lie? In reality, people tend to congregate around lifts and ticket machines. It follows that such areas will demand some form of special protection (such as screening). The ticket machines themselves need to be secured, too, such that they are not able to be toppled over and will remain resistant to theft at all times.

Improving car park integrity

With a new build development, there are several straightforward considerations that can radically improve the integrity of any car park. A design that's open, with no hidden or dark corners, set away from the building it serves and not underground, with separate entrances/exit ways for vehicles, deliveries and access to the main building would be the ideal.

If it's considered that there's an increased risk of terrorist attack then the car park should be as far away from any building and public thoroughfare as is practicably possible. A few simple security measures [-] including plenty of lighting, the incorporation of CCTV and a properly controlled exit and entry for both vehicles and pedestrians [-] will go a long way towards deterring crime (although perhaps not the ultra-determined terrorist).

Methods of construction are also of vital importance. The effects of an explosion in a confined space are magnified significantly. To minimise these effects, the car park area should be designed to allow the escape of gaseous products post-explosion. In other words, where it is unavoidable and a parking area has to be enclosed or built underground, venting or blow-out panels must be incorporated.

A great many multi-storey car parks are often constructed using pre-cast concrete components. That being the case, these may well need modification in order to avoid disproportionate or progressive collapse caused by an explosive devise severing or weakening key structural members. The structural components may need additional reinforcement, and certainly 'ties' to ensure the building is robust. The objective being to design the building so that, in the event of a member being weakened or destroyed by, say, a bomb, the building does not collapse.

Mitigating flying glass injury

The majority of injuries resulting from an explosion in a built-up environment are caused by flying glass. The injuries sustained can be exacerbated by the use of inappropriate glazing. For example, persons located in a street 30 metres distant from a car bomb would most likely survive, with the most serious hazard being projected debris resulting from the break-up of the vehicle.

However, if standard 4 mm or 6 mm-thick annealed glass were to be placed between those people and the explosion, then the observers would certainly be seriously injured (primarily due to the shards created by the break-up of the glass). Therefore, to avoid this kind of hazard, it's strongly recommended that any glazed areas within car parks be fitted with appropriate, laminated glass complete with strengthened frames.

Solutions for enclosed sites

Although most car parks are semi-open, many are now being enclosed to improve the environment for end users. However, there's a drawback to this, as enclosed spaces prevent venting of the gaseous products that result from a typical car explosion. They can also maximise their effects within the now more enclosed area.

There needs to be a strict procedure for access, with robust barriers and access controls (card or attendant), coupled with a proper process for visitors, with checking at the barrier by intercom (audio and video) or an attendant

Some of the car parks at UK international airports have been enclosed using a new innovative 'flapping window' solution. The special laminated glass and frame are hinged which, in the event of an explosion within the car park, will allow the window to flap open and the explosive force to exit outwards.

More importantly, even though the glazing units are likely to be badly damaged in the process, the glass and frame remain attached to the structure (thereby avoiding the formation of lethal glass shards and other debris from the glazing system that could injure pedestrians and motorists nearby).

For those car parks with a higher risk attached, security may be enhanced by including restricted access, with the photography of vehicles and drivers on entry and exit. This can incorporate visual recognition software linked to police databases that will almost instantly identify known criminals/terrorists or tagged vehicles and alert the appropriate authorities. Security may be strengthened still further by the addition of licensed and trained security officers.

The highest potential risk will be the car park adjoining (or that is part of) a major, prominent building [-] these would include high profile financial and commercial centres, Government buildings and transport hubs. If the building is considered a prime target, there would need to be additional security procedures. A terrorist action in such a car park, and in particular if it's below ground level, could have a profound effect upon the building and its occupants.

Strict procedure for access

Broadly speaking, the overriding priority is to control who is in the car park. There needs to be a strict procedure for access, with robust barriers and access controls (card or attendant), coupled with a proper process for visitors, with checking at the barrier by intercom (audio and video) or an attendant

The checking point needs to be outside the car park and building (suicide bombers tend to detonate at the first point of resistance, which can sometimes be an access barrier). Ideally, a separate ramp or bay should be used so as not to impede the entrance/exit way, particularly so if vehicles are being screened for devices.

It must be said that the use of attendants is an expensive option, but nonetheless still the most common. They can also control deliveries and collections to and from the site, which offer further potential routes for terrorists. All attendant staff must therefore be properly and rigorously vetted, trained to communicate and be issued with personal attack alarms.

Using duress code PINs

Another consideration is the odd occasion where an authorised user of the building may be forced to enter under duress. A system can be put in place to detect this without alerting the terrorist or criminal [-] the use of a duress code PIN at the point of access control. The duress code PIN is usually one number more or less than the correct PIN and will automatically alert the Security Team (the members of which will then instigate agreed procedures and plans).

VIPs (such as ministers in a Government building) present an additional risk and an added complication. A separate entrance/exit should be provided solely for their use, together with segregated parking and lifts. This will enable security operatives to keep these areas completely 'clean' and secure.

CCTV can act in a dual capacity as deterrent to the criminals/terrorists and as a reassurance to users of the car park. However, in many reviews of car park security CCTV is found to be ineffective for a host of reasons (no-one is constantly monitoring the screens or the picture quality is poor). Other common problems are bad or non-existent maintenance resulting in low picture quality, no enhancement for system use at night and even fundamentals such as camera positioning.

A final consideration for the practising security manager is the location of plant rooms and services. In multi-tenanted buildings, plant rooms should be segregated for each unit (with a separate entrance such that access can be controlled and contained).

Care also needs to be taken in routing the building services. Looking back to the first World Trade Centre bombing, although the damage was fairly limited in the underground car park and quickly repaired, by far the greatest impact could have been to a major fibre optic cable. This cable passed through the area and was nearly severed by the force of the explosion. If that had occurred there would have been significant business interruption for New York, not to mention destabilised international business confidence.