Ignore CBR threats at your peril!

The known hazards (and now established risk) identify an almost total dependency on Government responders to assist those in danger of both primary and secondary exposure. Indeed, the Government has advertised its assessments by the extensive procurement of decontamination units, the training of first responders – some of whom now routinely carry CBR protection – and by way of various exercises.

All of that now leaves the professional risk/security manager to make assessments. Current official and declared response to CBR attack has been modelled on past experience of explosive devices, with a slight adaptation from the experiences of the Tokyo Sarin event. Basically, this entails the establishment of hot, warm and cold zones with decontamination and tactical management being established on perimeters upwind.

The hot zone cordon estimated at 1,000 metres would be established to control and decontaminate those exposed, as well as prevent cross-contamination. This area in any central business district could contain upwards of 100,000 people, and in some cities twice that number. Logistically, the authorities are faced with an impossible task of control or response which may (inevitably) take days. Too long for those contaminated.

With that in mind, the following assessment should be considered by security professionals. Without constant wind speeds over 20 km, a contamination plume or upwind area may not be established. This would remove any possibility of a warm or cold site, and of the essential placement of decontamination units. Remember, too, that the unique microenvironment within a built-up area would result in a constant change of wind direction – and engender a continuous threat to buildings and/or personnel.

CBR agents can be estimated to travel many kilometres. In the case of the Chernobyl meltdown, radioactive particulate travelled across almost all of Europe (including the UK and Wales). In addition, CBR agents and their effects differ in many ways, but several clear guidelines are set. Stay out of its way or be protected, decontaminate quickly and be sure to recognise the (possible) need for prophylactic care.

Although public information regarding the threat (or indeed response) is extremely limited, useful contingency and information is available to SMT's readers on the Internet at www.cbr-response.com (the world's first CBR-specific contingency planning tool). It develops a tailored plan from the information you provide using a match-and-route matrix of over 3,000 possible actions.

Such a direct approach to the CBR risk confounds many of the alarmist critics who, in the absence of casualties or catastrophic loss, believe contingency planning for terrorism is merely scare mongering.

As is the case with fire, flood or explosion, contingency planning for terrorist CBR events is insurance. Insurance which, alas, is currently unavailable from our 'sensible' insurers.

Thank you for writing in, Jeff. Please accept this month's £25 drinks voucher for your efforts.