Flexibility: the key to ID cards for all

With the official go-ahead for a UK ID card scheme confirmed by the Home Office over five months ago, there has since been surprisingly little communication regarding the practicalities of the scheme and how the Government proposes the cards to work in the real world. The politicians aim to begin issuing ID cards in 2008-2009, which allows the Government just two years to achieve the delicate balance between deriving useful benefits from ID cards and at the same time protecting the privacy of citizens.

The security implications of such a vast project are two-fold. First, it’s clear the motive behind implementing the scheme is based on improving security through the robust identification of all UK citizens. Second, it will be vital to consider the security of the system itself and the manner in which personal information is stored, accessed and shared throughout the entire lifecycle of any one card.

The most fundamental issue at stake is whether or not it’s possible for a smart ID card to remain static from issuance through to its necessary replacement (typically estimated to be needed after a ten-year time span). If the cards can remain frozen in time, without any need for change, then there shouldn’t be any concern. Evidence from other smart ID projects around the world, however, strongly suggests that the cards will have to adapt to meet future demands. The ability to upgrade cards – by improving their security technology, for example is fundamental to their success, and this must be considered and implemented from the outset of the scheme.

Adapting to change

The success of any ID scheme must lie as much in the flexibility of the card to adapt to change as it does in ensuring the security of any personal information held on the database. Failure to mitigate the likelihood of change will inevitably mean that the initial investment has not been safeguarded. Here, the ‘citizen benefits’ will be low.

If a UK ID card project is launched without effective lifecycle management in place, the costs could be exponentially higher in a few years’ time as the cards and reliant systems will lack the flexibility to handle any subsequent changes. It’s inconvenient for the citizen, impractical for the Government and expensive to produce new cards every time the data on the Chip needs to be updated. Instead, the Government should introduce an ID card that may be remotely managed and updated.

Of course, legislation passed within the UK defines the data that the Government can hold on the national identity register and the ID card. It is absolutely essential to protect this sensitive personal information.

Initially, the UK smart ID cards will contain similar data to that held on e-passports. It’s likely that smart ID cards will eventually replace e-passports for travel within European boundaries. That being the case, it’s integral to the success of the ID card for it to employ security technology that’s compliant with multiple countries’ security access infrastructures. Not only does the technology have to conform to other European standards, it must also be adaptable to different data sources for varying departments, agencies or local/regional Government entities.

The magnitude of the UK ID card scheme in terms of the high volume of cards over a dispersed area demands careful consideration when selecting the appropriate technology to manage the information. Should a card be lost or stolen, a card management system must be able to handle the complexity of interacting with each department or database for the reissuance of the card.

If a change is required to an application, such as its expiry or rescinding its use, the management system needs to ensure smooth interaction between the database and the card without any requirement for the citizen to be actively involved (or any other application to be affected). It is details such as these that will be so essential to the end user’s day-to-day experience of the ID card.

An ability to highlight the flexibility of the scheme through the use of cost-effective, proven technology that can minimise future expense will be key to citizen acceptance.

Intruding on civil liberties

For the citizen, the ID card must not intrude on the sense of civil liberties. The solutions implemented to secure and manage the cards will play a vital role in reassuring citizens that their personal information is not being exploited by Government Departments or bodies other than those wherein the necessary information is held.

The main debate around which architectural platform will be best for managing the ID cards focuses on the decision about whether to implement a central database or distributed management systems with federation between them. While a central database would allow public service providers to share information, distributed management systems offer citizens convenient access to public services without having all of their personal data visible to all public service providers.

Failure to future-proof cards against developments in technology that continue to secure and manage the information stored on the Chip will leave the Government vulnerable to additional expense post-card issuance. To ensure public support, it will also be vital to launch a card that will be of benefit to the citizens themselves while at the same time maintaining robust security of the data held both on the card and within the database(s).