Can we combat suicide bombers?

It's by no means a new phenomenon, though. There have been many examples down the years, and by no means do all of those occurrences involve Muslims (the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka are a recent example of a non-Muslim group involved in this particular brand of terrorism). Certainly, the trend towards the suicide bomber would appear to be increasing, particularly since 9/11.

On home shores, there now seems to be a perception that: "Suicide bombing's going to happen in the UK. It's simply a question of when…" Statements of this nature are constantly re-iterated by various security industry commentators and so-called 'experts'. Even by certain authorities who don't want to be accused of not giving a warning, just in case.

Already, many public debates, mainstream television programmes (including an hour-long special on Channel 4) and media articles have appeared. All of them concentrating on the background to suicide bombing. The motives of the people behind these attacks, their psychological profile and their raison d'etre.

Security Management Today (SMT) has never been a journal that re-packages the same old topics in a different way, and we're not about to start here! That being the case, let's examine the subject from a practical point of view, and review how security managers – particularly those in charge of security for major companies in the main UK cities – might actively confront the problem.

What you're about to read is very much a personal assessment. Not a military one (although that's where my background lies, of course), nor an 'official' view. Not even necessarily the view of my colleagues at the SDS Group. Rather, it is the view of someone who, in the capacity of a bomb disposal officer, has been at the sharp end of bombing incidents on the UK mainland, in Northern Ireland, South America, the Middle East and Sri Lanka.

Indeed, some SMT readers might even have been privy to my published investigative report (which resulted in both a Commonwealth and Presidential Inquiry).

In essence, it's not merely a case of witnessing an incident from behind a cordon, or even being in the same town when a suicide bombing occurs. What security managers need are some answers… But before we delve into the tactics and aims of suicide bombers, and then look at possible countermeasures, it's well worth considering some of the practicalities of suicide bombing.

Examining the bombers' 'art'
It's not simply a case of strapping a few sticks of explosive around one's waist and then walking into Selfridges on Oxford Street. First, due to the fact that our bodies consist mainly of liquid mass they're surprisingly resilient to blast. Thus a couple of kilograms of high explosive is only likely to kill the carrier.

Much more explosive is actually needed to do any significant damage (including severe injuries and/or death). Several kilograms, in fact, and some shrapnel in the form of nails, ball bearings or metal plates that will easily fragment on detonation of the device.

Where is someone on the UK mainland going to come by, say, 10 kilograms of high explosive? Not easy. Not only are there very strict regulations in place, but the outlets for such 'goods' have been considerably restricted and monitored of late. 30 years or more of the IRA threat has seen to that.

Judging by current activity, there’s little doubt that the major aim of most suicide bomb attacks is to kill or seriously injure as large a number of (innocent) people as possible, with the secondary aims of causing damage and destruction – vehicle bombs

"Import the explosives from the continent!" I hear you cry. Although most of us are usually quite cynical about the degree of security at our ports and airports, it does happen to be much better than in many other parts of the world. Being an island is very much a distinct advantage in this respect.

Second, in areas such as those previously mentioned the 'safe houses' used for assembling the explosives and attaching them to a person (or persons) or constructing them inside a vehicle are by and large not very far from the target. This reduces the risk of interception or discovery.

In this country, the instigators would find it extremely difficult to carry out this assembly work, and would be highly vulnerable while travelling to their targeted destination. When added to the fact that there are many 'softer' British or American targets elsewhere around the world, suicide bombing in the UK seems to be a far less attractive proposition. That's not to say it's impossible, but it's not as probable as many would think.

What are the countermeasures?
As is the case with all low risk, high impact threats to security and safety, it's extremely important to consider reasonable, practical and cost-effective countermeasures.

The threat assessment must first examine the aims of the terrorist. Judging by current activity, there's little doubt that the major aim of most suicide bomb attacks is to kill or seriously injure as large a number of (innocent) people as possible, with the secondary aims of causing damage and destruction (vehicle bombs spring to mind here) and obtaining publicity to promote, say, a political cause.

Success plays an important part in suicide bombing. For Al-Qaeda and the Palestinian 'Shaheeds' or martyrs one of the key factors behind volunteering to be the carrier is that the individual concerned will receive heavenly rewards as a result of fulfilling God's will. This is their – or in many cases their parents' – interpretation of the Koran. Merely killing yourself is insufficient because you haven't advanced the cause or achieved anything by your death.

As you might imagine, this places a good deal of extra pressure on the bomber. Hence the attraction of 'softer' targets. In addition, this also goes some way towards helping us in assessing countermeasures. You might not be able to stop the bomber – without doubt the biggest fear for many security professionals at the present time – but reducing the effects could discourage the terrorist.

That's why it's my firm opinion that a suicide vehicle bomb is more likely in the UK than a person-borne explosive. The advantage of a vehicle is that you can use less efficient explosive material simply because you're going to employ more of it. This type of explosive is more readily available, too, and may even be home-made (witness the Provisional IRA fertiliser bombs used in the City of London, London's Docklands and in Manchester). It also eases the problem of transport (ie the vehicle can be brought directly in from a remote area).

Vehicle bombs: the main points
Vehicle bombs have been used on mainland UK not just by the Provisional IRA, but also Middle Eastern terror groups and more recently the Real IRA (at Ealing Broadway and in central Birmingham). The bombs were all detonated using a timing device and, in the case of the IRA bombs, came with a warning. They were not suicide bombings, although the Israeli Embassy bombing was indiscriminate.

Not surprisingly, the key for terrorists wishing to cause maximum casualties with a vehicle bomb is to get close to large numbers of people. Any distance put between the bomb and its intended targets will considerably reduce the effects as blast overpressures deteriorate rapidly with both distance and time (witness 'Exploding the myths', SMT, May 2001, pp32-34).

Where is someone on the UK mainland going to come by, say, 10 kilograms of high explosive? Not easy. Not only are there very strict regulations in place, but the outlets for such ‘goods’ have been considerably restricted and monitored of late. 30

Recent suicide vehicle bombs have shown the vehicle concerned being driven into a building or through a barrier to make sure that it's close to the structure. For some time now, security professionals have been aware of this threat. Indeed, many members of the general public will be familiar with notices advising that there will be no parking within a 25-metre radius of buildings (and, in particular, Government buildings).

That said, notices aren't going to prevent the sort of immediate violent action perpetrated by a suicide bomber. Nor are lightweight obstacles. Thus for higher risk organisations and those that have the space and environment far more solid obstacles will be needed. Those obstacles don't need to take up a lot of space, nor do they have to look ugly or appear to be out of place. Relatively simple solutions are available, such as beams sunk into the ground to the required depth (size of beam and depth will depend upon the stopping distance available) and topped-off with a bollard-style design.

Although prevention is better than cure, sometimes mitigation of the effects is the only option. Here, it's vital to understand what's going to happen in an explosion and predict the amount of damage accurately otherwise money, time and effort will be wasted. It's recommended that security professionals make their predictions on three credible attack scenarios. It will then become more obvious as to what are the really critical issues.

A good example is the propagation of the blast wave inside a given building. If we can manage this by strengthening some areas leading off from the main reception area or the entrance hall and weakening others, we can then divert the main source of damage and injury into an area of less importance and occupation. This isn't necessarily an expensive course of action, but some buildings will be easier to adapt than others.

Hope is not lost even for those security managers whose company building features a glazed atrium. Something can always be done.

Strengthening glazing systems
Speaking of glazing, many of SMT's readers' buildings – especially those located in the City and central London – will already have had anti-shatter film applied. In the aftermath of the St Mary Axe and Bishopsgate bombings in which the benefits of anti-shatter film were only too obvious, many opted for this as a minimum form of protection. The films were generally 150 or 175 microns thick and applied edge-to-edge to existing tiles.

There are some points security managers should note here. There is now a 200 micron multiply film available – as well as the 3m ScotchShield Ultra Film (a bit expensive) – which is far stronger than normal films. You can also anchor these films rather than edge-to-edge them. That will make a huge difference in terms of performance (and thus protection).

Obviously, there's no kind of window film available that can provide adequate protection if a significant bomb is detonated nearby. However, if security managers allow a sacrificial element in these highly vulnerable areas and upgrade others, then a real difference can indeed be made.

To summarise, there's a tangible threat from suicide bombers – but there are currently many factors reducing the likelihood of such an attack on the UK mainland. These same factors place more emphasis on a vehicle or car bomb than a personal one. However, choosing to ignore the threat is neither a sensible nor a responsible option.

It's strongly recommended that a vulnerability assessment based on at least three credible attack scenarios is carried out and some appropriate countermeasures considered. Time spent in preparation is seldom wasted. It may be too late – and far more expensive – to wait until the first incident occurs before taking action.